🌟 Editor's note

Editor’s Note | Week of 16 February 2025

By Carter Hoffman

A slightly shorter week for parts of the TTP team, with Chinese New Year celebrations across Asia and the Family Day holiday in Canada. That said, things didn’t slow down all that much. We’ve been busy planning upcoming events, covering the industry, and recording a few new conversations that will be coming your way soon.

We also welcomed two new team members this week! Ronald joining our Philippines-based team, and Scott is joining us in Toronto. It’s great to see the team continue to grow, and we’re looking forward to getting them fully up to speed on all things TTP.

On the editorial side, we covered developments across correspondent banking, digital trade legislation in India, and activity in the credit and surety market, alongside a couple of new pieces on cross-border payments and post-ISO realities. Our slow read this week is a deep dive into the transatlantic trade relationship. Is it love? Is it fear? Or is it FOMO?

As always, plenty to catch up on from this first week of the year of the Horse

Until next time — full steam ahead.

— The TTP Editorial Team

Skip to your favourite part

• Slow Read

• Transatlantic trade wars: US courts Europe while t …

• Trade digest

• Treasury, payment and global banking digest

• 🗓️ Upcoming events

• Multimedia from Trade Treasury Payments

• 🚀 Our latest edition

Slow Read

Transatlantic trade wars: US courts Europe while tightening the economic noose

Is it love? Is it fear? Or is it FOMO? I think it is – everything is fair in love and war when it comes to the United States’ stance on global geopolitics. Early this year, the US shocked the world with the strike on Venezuela! Then came the threat to acquire Greenland by any means possible. However, Greenland, being a Danish territory and therefore under NATO protection, is not a quick cease-and-desist. Did this fail to stir the still water of geopolitics? I don’t think so.

It’s this that on 14th February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Europe at the Munich Security Conference, declaring that Washington wants to “recharge” the transatlantic alliance so a powerful Europe can assist the US in a global mission of “renewal.”

This comes after months of friction fueled by President Donald Trump’s interest in annexing Greenland and his disparaging remarks toward allies and the threat of imposing high tariffs.

The Greenland question: Following a long American tradition

Trump’s fixation on acquiring Greenland, first revealed during his initial term, has transformed from a diplomatic curiosity into a cornerstone of his second-term foreign policy.

His interest in Greenland comes from multiple strategic calculations. First, the territory possesses vast mineral resources, including rare earth elements (REEs) crucial for advanced technologies and defence systems. China has heavy control over REEs (60% on production and 90% for processing). As China has imposed restrictions on REE exports, it directly impacts the US’s defence sector. The US’s advanced defence systems, such as Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, drones, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) smart bombs, and F-35 fighter jets, require REEs.

This makes Greenland quite valuable for the US. Greenland also offers valuable deep-water ports and potential military installations in an increasingly contested Arctic region. It is a strategic foothold between North America and Europe that can significantly enhance American geopolitical positioning.

Amidst resistance from Denmark and support from the other EU countries, Trump imposed 10% tariffs on “any and all goods” from Denmark as well as the other 8 EU countries from 1 February, which could increase to 25% if no deal is struck by June.

America’s hook or crook pursuit of Greenland is not new.

Let’s rewind a bit. During the Cold War, the US repeatedly tried to buy Greenland from Denmark. Secretary of State James Byrnes made a direct offer in 1946, demanding full American sovereignty over the island. The Danes refused then as they refuse now.

Its historical irony cuts deep. When signing the 1916 treaty to acquire the Virgin Islands from Denmark for $25 million, Secretary of State Robert Lansing explicitly promised “that the Government of the United States of America will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.” This historical agreement now stands in stark contrast to current American ambitions.

The annexation of foreign territories has been a recurring theme in American history. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 presented similar constitutional questions about the federal government’s power to acquire foreign territory. President Thomas Jefferson initially had concerns about whether the Constitution explicitly granted such authority, but ultimately proceeded with the treaty.

In 1823, Chief Justice John Marshall clarified in American Insurance Co. v. Canter that “The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.”

The acquisition of Texas and Hawaii had even more controversial precedents. After the Senate rejected a treaty of annexation for Texas in 1844, President John Tyler worked with President-elect James Knox Polk to have Texas admitted as a state using a joint resolution of Congress, which required only a simple majority vote. This move was criticised by some as exceeding congressional powers under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause.

Similarly, Hawaii’s annexation followed a complex and controversial path. American planter interests engineered a coup backed by a US warship to remove Queen Liliuokalani in 1893. After failed attempts to annex Hawaii through Senate treaty and joint resolution processes, the territory was finally annexed in 1898 amid the Spanish-American War through a joint resolution of Congress.

Trade digest

Treasury, payment and global banking digest

🗓️ Upcoming events

Multimedia from Trade Treasury Payments

🚀 Our latest edition

Did You Know? 

More than 75 percent of USD correspondent banking flows are now cleared through fewer than 10 global institutions.

While the narrative over the past decade has focused on derisking and withdrawal from emerging markets, the deeper structural shift is concentration. Access has not disappeared. It has consolidated.

For emerging and frontier markets, the issue in 2026 is less about whether a USD corridor exists and more about how many viable alternatives remain if one node fails.

At the same time, electronic trade legislation in markets such as India and Scotland, along with the move towards ISO 20022 data rich messaging, is reshaping how liquidity, documentation and compliance intersect.

Resilience in trade and treasury is no longer just about access.

It is about diversification, digital recognition and data integrity.

Trade Treasury Payments (TTP)